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Abstract
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and then tracks its implementation over time. There are two main results. When facing
a costly task to be completed under a deadline, two thirds of subjects prefer anticipating
it rather than postponing it. Choice reversals are common although present-biased
preferences alone cannot explain them. This evidence is compatible with models based
on anticipatory feelings and stochastic utility.
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Intertemporal choices are ubiquitous in economics, and understanding their motivations
is crucial to predict patterns of retirement savings, purchase of durable goods, addictions,
and health choices, just to name a few. The empirical literature has shown that impatience
and temptation are major motivations of intertemporal choices (e.g., Schelling, 1978, Warner
and Pleeter, 2001, Benartzi and Thaler, 2004, Brown et al., 2009, Tanaka et al., 2010). There
may be other important drives such as risk, uncertainty, and anticipatory feelings. These
drives have some bearing on the topic and may be an essential part of many intertemporal
problems (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1991, Sozou, 1998, Fernandez-Villaverde and Mukherji,
2002, Dasgupta and Maskin, 2005, Halevy, 2008, Manzini and Mariotti, 2010). This study
aims at uncovering their impact. The empirical issue is how to disentangle the role of
anticipatory feelings and uncertainty from the role played by impatience and temptation.
To this end, we present a model of intertemporal choice that extends the canonical model by
incorporating uncertainty and anticipatory feelings. We also designed and ran an experiment
where impatient agents are predicted to behave in a similar way, irrespective of whether
they are exponential or quasi-hyperbolic discounters. Hence observed deviations from these
predictions ought to originate from motivations other than impatience or temptation.
Interestingly, the vast majority of the experimental studies on time preferences have
a static setting: subjects choose only at one date. This study presents an experiment of
intertemporal choices in a dynamic setting where subjects choose at multiple dates, which
allows for a deeper understanding of time preferences and, in particular, of choice reversals
over time. Under the customary assumption of exponential time preferences, an individual
should choose an optimal plan of consumption and then, given the same information, carry
out the plan (Strotz, 1955). To validate this prediction, one should follow the individual
choices over time or, at least, elicit the current plan and then track its future implementation.
However, many experiments adopt a di¤erent technique to study time consistency: they
compare a series of intertemporal choices made in a given moment. We refer to this as
the static experimental approach. Such experiments often report a lower discount factor
for short-run horizons than for long-run horizons, and then conclude that time preferences
are not exponential (e.g., Kirby and Herrnstein, 1995). To account for this evidence, many
scholars argue in favor of a quasi-hyperbolic model of time preferences as a better descriptor
of intertemporal choices and suggest that individuals are tempted by, and some of them
fall for, instantaneous gratication (e.g., Laibson, 1997). Instead, we adopt a dynamic
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experimental approach, which elicits individual decisions at multiple points in time. The
dynamic approach allows tracking the consistency between a plan and its implementation,
and it provides useful information for studying self-control problems.
In the experiment subjects faced a task to be completed under a deadline. The task
required a real e¤ort as it involved listening to annoying noise, which had to be "consumed"
in the lab.1 In a sense, it is prototypical of any activity requiring a costly e¤ort. The basic
elements of the experimental design are as follows. Each subject attended three sessions in
exchange for a xed participation fee.
In Session 0 : Subjects rank three choices: to listen to the noise immediately ( = 0),
in two weeks ( = 1), or in four weeks ( = 2). In addition, subjects bid in an auction to
acquire the option to revise their ranking in two weeks, i.e. they could buy exibility. All
choices were properly incentivized.
In Session 1 : All subjects who did not listen to the noise in Session 0 rank two options:
to listen to the noise immediately ( = 1) or in two weeks ( = 2). This ranking of Session 1
applies if a subject won the auction to revise her ranking; otherwise, the ranking of Session
0 applies.
In Session 2 : All subjects who did not listen to noise in either Session 0 or Session 1
listen to noise.
We report that about two thirds of subjects preferred to anticipate noise listening to ses-
sion 0. Moreover, choice reversal was common even if it cannot be explained by temptation
alone. This empirical evidence is not a falsication of the exponential or the quasi-hyperbolic
models, but rather it strongly suggests the presence of other major motivations for intertem-
poral choices beyond impatience and temptation. In particular, the data points toward an
important role for uncertainty and anticipatory feelings.
This paper contributes both to the experimental and the theoretical literature on in-
tertemporal choices. First of all, it provides a model of intertemporal choice that extends
the canonical discounting model by allowing for uncertainty and anticipatory feelings. The
model claries the interwinding roles of discounting, sophistication and uncertainty for the
demand for precommitment and exibility. More generally, it provides a unied framework
for issues that are often presented separately in the literature on intertemporal choice. It
1Using noise as a stimulus is common among experimental psychologists (e.g., Millar and Navarick, 1984).
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also puts forward di¤erent, complementary notions of choice reversals over time that are
key to understand the issue of time inconsistency. In the second part, the paper presents
a novel dynamic experiment that employs a consumption good, rather than money. Con-
sumption goods are an important domain of choice for economic decisions and can solve
methodological issues for the empirical measurement of time preferences, in particular stor-
ability and tradability. The experimental results show the existence of choice reversals even
when present-biased preferences alone would not predict them. They also provide convincing
evidence about the relevance of other drives beyond discounting.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 reviews the literature. Section 2 describes
the theoretical setup and Section 3 describes the experimental design. Section 4 puts for-
ward theoretical predictions for models driven by discounting, uncertainty, and anticipatory
feelings. Section 5 presents the experimental results. Discussions and concluding remarks
are presented in Sections 6 and 7.
1 Literature review
There are few dynamic experiments about time preferences: some studies concern choices
about attendance at the gym and about physical exercise (Dellavigna and Malmendier, 2006,
Charness and Gneezy, 2009), others consider studying activities (Ariely and Wertenbroch,
2002), or money (Casari, 2009). These studies provide evidence on how subjects dynamically
implement their plan of actions over time. Most of them focus their analysis and discussions
on the role of present-biased preferences and on the ability of a model based on exponential
discounting to explain the evidence. Special attention is given to the agentssophistication
in intertemporal choices and to the role of precommitment devices. More generally, most
of the current debate in intertemporal choices is about present-biased preferences (Laibson,
1997, ODonoghue and Rabin, 1999). Instead, this paper aims at uncovering which factors
may drive intertemporal choices besides discounting and temptation.
A key nding in favor of present-biased preferences is the widespread evidence of choice
reversals over time (e.g. Kirby and Herrnstein, 1995, Benhabib et al., 2006, Casari, 2009).
Some of the explanations for choice reversal refer to the temptation of immediate rewards
or lack of self-control (e.g., Laibson, 1997, Fudenberg and Levine, 2006), while others rely
on other drivers. A theoretically well-known driver is uncertainty about the future, which
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may be articulated in many ways. Yaari (1965) studies the impact of uncertain lifetime;
Sozou (1995) considers discounting as a function of the risk that a delayed reward may not
be received; Azfar (1999) studies the role of uncertain discount rates; Fernández-Villaverde
and Mukherji (2006) consider random shocks on consumption preferences; Dasgupta and
Maskin (2005) study an uncertain environment where payo¤s may be realized early; and
Halevy (2008) considers the role of uncertain lifetime and default probability. Interestingly,
experimental results of intertemporal choices are often interpreted under the assumption of
a certainty scenario. This assumption facilitates the identication of a point estimate for
discount factors, but it neglects that uncertainty is often an intrinsic feature of intertemporal
decisions, even when the experimenter does not explicitly introduce it. The neglect of uncer-
tainty may be one of the sources of the large variability in the estimates of discount factors
reported in the literature (Frederick et al., 2002). A way of dealing with both uncertainty
and present-biased preferences is presented in ODonoghue and Rabin (1999), who consider
the case where the cost to complete a task is stochastic and agents may have incentives to
procrastinate. Our theoretical set-up builds upon ODonoghue and Rabin (1999), presents
alternative denitions for choice reversals over time, and allows for discounting, uncertainty,
and anticipatory feelings.
There exist experiments of intertemporal choice involving money and experiments in-
volving non-monetary rewards. Both domains are relevant for economic decisions and both
may help in studying time preferences. The former domain is relevant for nancial decisions,
while the latter one is relevant for economic situations involving, for instance, exerting e¤ort,
completing chores, or consuming goods. Experiments with non-monetary rewards have used
noise (Millar and Navarick, 1984), rice (Pender, 1996), drinking water (Brown et al., 2009),
and chocolate (Reuben et al., 2010). The most common practice among experimental econo-
mists is to use money as a reward. It is possible that the experimental results over money
di¤er from those over a consumption good if preferences are domain-specic and/or if there
are measurement errors when using money. In both cases additional evidence on consump-
tion goods can shed light on time preferences. For instance, if time preferences turned out
to be domain specic, the results obtained over money rewards would not extend to very
common activities in the workplace and in everyday life such as ling a tax return, tiding
up the o¢ ce desk, completing an assignment, going to the gym, watching TV, or playing
with the children. One aspect that may distinguish monetary from non monetary outcomes
5
is the arousal of anticipatory feelings. Loewenstein (1987) argued that there may be anx-
iety while waiting for a bad outcome, and savouring while waiting for a positive outcome,
in which cases anticipatory feelings produce an opposite e¤ect with respect to discounting.
The idea of anticipatory feelings is appealing and intuitive, however the existing evidence
over intertemporal choices is still weak (Casari and Dragone, 2011) and deserves further
experimental validation.
Another possible reason for domain-specic experimental results are measurement errors
(Coller and Williams, 1999, Cubitt and Read, 2007). One issue with money is storability,
which does not allow controlling for the timing of consumption. Instead, with a reward to be
consumed in the lab and that cannot be stored for later, one can be sure about the timing
of consumption and obtain more reliable information on time preferences. There is also an
issue of tradability of money outside the lab, which allows for intertemporal arbitrage due
to the existence of an external credit market. Both storability and tradability of the reward
medium may bias the measurement of intertemporal preferences in the laboratory.2
2 Completing a task under a deadline: a model
This Section presents a model of intertemporal choice that includes discounting, anticipatory
feelings, and stochastic utility as its basic components. First, it describes the utility function
and the model setup, which is dynamic because agents make choices at multiple dates. Then,
it studies how individual choices depend on whether the plan of actions is rigid or exible.
2.1 The utility function
Consider a discrete-time environment, where t 2 f0; 1; 2; : : : ; Tg and T can be either nite
or innite. At time  the agent consumes x 2 Rn and obtains an instantaneous utility
u (x ) = z  v (x), where z 2 [0;+1] is a random shock and v (x) is a stationary function.
Assume that the agents intertemporal utility is separable across periods and that it can be
represented by the following weighted sum of current and future instantaneous utility
U(t) =
TX
=t
 (   t)u (x ) : (1)
2Some consumption goods like rice or chocolate do not solve the storability and tradability issues.
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The weight function  (   t) depends on the delay between the consumption date  and
the decision date t. We consider the following separable weight function, for   t :
 (   t) = D (   t) + 1AA (   t)
D (0) + 1AA (0)
:
The termD (   t) represents a discounting function whereD (   t)  0 andD0 (   t)  0;
D(0) is normalized to one. The term A (   t) represents an anticipatory feelings function,
with A (   t)  0, A0 (   t)  0, and A(0) = 1. 1A is an indicator function: it is equal
to one if the good generates anticipatory feelings and it is zero otherwise. As a conse-
quence  (   t)  0 and  (0) = 1; the sign of 0 (   t) can be either positive or negative,
depending on the relative importance of discounting and anticipatory feelings. For goods
that do not generate anticipatory feelings, the weight function boils down to a standard
discounting function, i.e.  (   t) = D (   t) =D (0) ; as it is non increasing in the delay
between the time of consumption and the current date,  (   t)0  0; receiving the good
soon is (weakly) preferred to receiving it later. For goods that generate anticipatory feelings,
instead, anticipating consumption may be suboptimal.
2.2 A simple dynamic setup
To study intertemporal choices it is useful to track individual choices as time goes on. This
requires a dynamic setup where agents make decisions at multiple dates. We consider a
simple case with three equally distant dates (0, 1 and 2) and agents who make decisions at
dates 0 and 1. Agents face three decision problems (Figure 1):
Decision A: at date 0, choice between consuming x0 or x1;
Decision B: at date 0, choice between consuming x1 or x2;
Decision C: at date 1, choice between consuming x1 or x2:
Suppose that, when making her choice at date t, the agent knows the current realization
of the random shock zt. In decision A, the agent prefers to consume immediately x0; rather
than consuming x1 at date 1, if
u (x0)   (1)E [u (x1)] ;
where E [u (x1)] is the expected utility of consuming x1. In decision B, the current realization
of the shock does not matter; the agent prefers sooner consumption x1 if
 (1)E [u (x1)]   (2)E [u (x2)] ;
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Decision A
Decision B
Decision C
x0 x1
Date        0              1              2
x1
x1
x2
x2
Figure 1: Decisions A, B, and C. The circle indicates when the choice is elicited. Comparison
between A and B informs on static choice reversal, comparison between B and C on dynamic
choice reversal, comparison between A and C on calendar choice reversal.
and she prefers later consumption x2 otherwise. Decision C is similar to decision A, with
the only di¤erence that all dates are shifted forward in time; the agent prefers to consume
immediately x1 if
u (x1)   (1)E [u (x2)] ;
and she prefers to postpone and consume x2 otherwise.
2.3 Three notions of choice reversal
A dynamic setup allows for studying di¤erent denitions of choice reversal. This is useful
because the experimental literature denes choice reversal over time di¤erently from the
theoretical literature. Experimentalists generally infer choice reversal through comparisons
across decision problems that are faced at one point in time. In the typical choice task,
subjects are presented with two decision problems: one over a short-run horizon and another
over a long-run horizon. For instance, they choose between receiving $100 now and receiving
$110 tomorrow, and between receiving $100 in 30 days and receiving $110 in 31 days. If a
subject chooses $100 now in the former decision and $110 in 31 days in the latter one, then
a choice reversal is detected (Frederick et al., 2002). Theorists instead dene choice reversal
through comparisons within the same decision problem that is faced at di¤erent points in
time (Strotz, 1955). Consider, for instance, a person deliberating whether to start dieting
in March rather than April. If in January she prefers to start dieting in March and then in
March she prefers to start in April, then theorists detect a choice reversal.
To characterize intertemporal choices and clarify the misunderstandings between the
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experimental and the theoretical literature, we propose three formal denitions: static, cal-
endar, and dynamic choice reversal. These denitions are based on pairwise comparisons
between the choices made in decisions A, B, and C (Figure 1), but they can be extended to
a general intertemporal setup. Given our dynamic experimental design, we will be able to
quantify choice reversals according to all three denitions.
Denition 1. A static choice reversal is detected if sooner consumption is chosen in A
and later consumption in B, or later consumption is chosen in A and sooner consumption in
B.
Denition 2. A dynamic choice reversal is detected if either sooner consumption is
chosen in B and later consumption in C, or later consumption is chosen in B and sooner
consumption in C.
Denition 3. A calendar choice reversal is detected if either sooner consumption is
chosen in A and later consumption in C, or later consumption is chosen in A and sooner
consumption in C.
Only a dynamic experimental design that includes decision C enables us to measure all
three notions of choice reversal. Experimentalists typically employ the notion of static choice
reversal as evidence for a non constant discount rate. For studying self-control problems,
however, one is interested in assessing whether the choice made under the temptation of
immediate gratication (decision C) is consistent with the plan made in advance (decision
B), when the temptation was still distant in time. Hence, to study self-control and the role
of exibility and precommitment, dynamic choice reversal is a more useful notion than static
choice reversal.
2.4 Rigid and exible plans for completing a task under a deadline
Consider a task to be completed within a deadline. Completing the task at date  entails
a cost, u (x ) =  c ; where c captures any immediate disutility to the agent arising from
completing it, including opportunity cost. Let c = z  c, where z represents a stochastic
shock that a¤ects the cost to the agent of completing the task. The task cost is drawn from a
stationary distribution with support [c
¯
; c], where c
¯
 0, and cumulative distribution function
F (c ). For notational simplicity, let F (c¯
) = 0. We assume that the agent knows the density
function f (c ) and that, at date t, she observes the task cost realization ct before choosing
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whether or not to perform the task. This uncertainty scenario is similar to ODonoghue and
Rabin (1999).
We consider the case where T = 2: If the task is completed within date 2, the agent is paid
a xed monetary amount m at date 2 and she is paid m
¯
2 [0; m) otherwise.3 Uncertainty does
not a¤ect the utility of money and future monetary rewards do not generate anticipatory
feelings. By assuming separability between money and task cost, the agents utility (1) from
completing the task at time  is,
U(t) =
8<: D (2  t) m  ctD (2  t) m   (   t)E [c ]
if  = t
if  > t
where E [c ] is the expected cost of completing at  : We assume that the expected cost
is ce for all  > t, and that the agent always prefers completing the task rather than not
completing it and receiving only m
¯
.
The preference over completing the task at a specic date depends on whether the agent
follows a rigid plan or a exible plan.
Under rigid planning an agent makes a plan of actions at a specic date without the
option of updating this plan in future dates. The agents preferred date for completing the
task is the one that yields the minimum expected cost. At date t, before choosing whether
or not to perform the task, the agent observes the task cost realization ct. Hence, at date
t the agent prefers completing the task immediately if the task cost is su¢ ciently low. We
dene strigid as the cuto¤ value such that it is optimal for the agent to complete the task in
the current date t if and only if ct  strigid, where for t < T :
strigid =
8>><>>:
 t
c
¯
c
if c
¯
  t  c
if  t <c¯
if  t > c
and
 t = min
2(t;T ]
f (   t)gce:
The value  t is the minimum expected cost of completing the task at a future date.
3In ODonoghue and Rabin (1999, p. 780), when the agent completes the task at date t; she receives a
payment in the following date. Hence the terminal time is T = t+ 1 and is not xed.
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In our setup, where T = 2; when the agent makes a rigid plan at date 0, the minimum
expected cost to complete the task in a future date is:4
 0 =
8<:  (1) ce (2) ce if  (1)   (2)if  (1)   (2) :
Now consider an agent who can update her initial plan of actions at any date t. We denote
this case as exible planning. The agent observes the task cost realization ct before choosing
whether or not to perform the task. Optimality may require that the agent completes the
task when the task cost is low, and that she waits when the task cost is high. Given a time-
horizon T within which the agent must complete the task, at time t the agents behavior can
be described by a strategy stex 
 
stt; s
t
t+1; :::; s
t
T

, which is a vector of cuto¤ costs such that
the agent plans to complete the task at date k = t; t+1; :::; T if and only if ck  stk 2 [c¯; c].
5
If the task has not been completed by date T , by assumption the agent completes it at T
irrespective of the realization of the cost cT ; which implies stT = c for all t. To compute
the remaining cuto¤ values, we follow ODonoghue and Rabin (1999) in dening a hazard
function h ( jt; stex) ; which denotes the probability that the agent will not complete the task
before date  > t given that she has waited up to date t and plans to follow strategy stex
thereafter:
h
 
 jt; stex

=
8<: 1Q 1
i=t+1 (1  F (sti))
if  = t+ 1
if  > t+ 1:
(2)
From the perspective of date t, an agent who waits at date k and then follows strategy stex
thereafter incurs the following expected (weighted) task cost:
k
 
stex

=
TX
=k+1
 (   t)h   jt; stexF  stE c jc  st ; (3)
4If  (1) >  (2) ; completing at date 2 is preferred to completing at date 1 because discounting weights
more than anticipatory feelings (for events at dates 1 and 2). If instead  (1) <  (2) ; the opposite holds.
Which of the two conditions holds is revealed in decision B.
5If agents are aware of their future preferences (e.g. time consistent agents and sophisticated time incon-
sistent agents), beliefs over cuto¤ values used in future periods are correctly assessed, e.g. s01 = s
1
1. For
time inconsistent agents, the cuto¤ costs may depend on when the exible plan is elicited. For instance, at
date 0 a naïve quasi-hyperbolic discounter has a belief s01 about the cuto¤ value that will be used at date 1,
which may not be the actual cuto¤ value s11 used at date 1. Note that ODonoghue and Rabin (1999) use a
slightly di¤erent notation.
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where E [cjc  ]  R c
¯
cf(c)dc=F (). From the perspective of date t; the agent should
complete the task at date k if the task cost ck is less or equal to the expected cost of waiting
at k, conditional on following strategy stex in the future. This implies that, for t < T , s
t
k is:
stk =
8>><>>:
k (s
t
ex)
c
¯
c
if c
¯
 k (stex)  c
if k (s
t
ex) <c¯
if k (s
t
ex) > c:
: (4)
In our setup, where T = 2; the hazard function is h(1j0; s0ex) = h(2j1; s1ex) = 1 and
h(2j0; s0ex) = 1  F (s01) : This implies the following:
0
 
s0ex

= (1)F (s01)E

c1jc1  s01

+ (2)
 
1  F (s01)

ce;
1
 
s0ex

= (2)
 
1  F (s01)

ce;
1
 
s1ex

= (1)ce:
The probability of completing the task increases as the deadline T approaches for both
exponential and quasi-hyperbolic agents with no anticipatory feelings: 0 (s
0
ex) < 1 (s
1
ex).
This property may not hold, however, for agents with anticipatory feelings (see the Appendix
for details).
2.5 The value of exibility and precommitment
At date 0 an agent values exibility if she prefers a exible plan to a rigid plan. The
opposite happens when an agent values precommitment. The preference for exibility or for
precommitment is strictly linked to the notion of dynamic choice reversal, and it depends
on several factors: the weighting function, the expected distribution of future costs of task
completion, and the beliefs about the agents future behavior.
Consider a rigid plan made at date 0, and suppose that the agent does not complete the
task immediately because the current cost is too high (c0 > s0rigid). Hence she will complete
the task either at date 1 or at date 2, depending on her plan (decision B). More precisely,
she will complete at date 1 if (1)  (2); and she will complete at date 2 otherwise. Hence
the expected weighted cost Crigid (0) of completing the task under rigid planning is, from the
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perspective of date 0:
Crigid (0) =
8<: (2)ce(1)ce if (1)  (2)if (1)  (2):
=  0:
Consider a exible plan made at date 0, and suppose that the agent does not complete the
task immediately because the current cost is too high (c0 > s00). The agent believes that she
will complete the task at date 1 depending on the cuto¤ value s01. The probability that the
task cost at date 1 is low is F (s01) : Hence, the expected weighted cost Cex (0) of completing
the task under exible planning is, from the perspective of time 0:
Cex (0) = (1)F (s
0
1)E

c1jc1 < s01

+ (2)
 
1  F  s01 ce
= 0
 
s0ex

:
Precommitment is preferred if Crigid (0) < Cex (0) ; and exibility is preferred otherwise.
The di¤erence Crigid (0)   Cex (0) depends on three elements: the functional form of the
weighting function ; the agent belief about her future behavior s01, and the expectation on
future task costs. Proposition 1 considers the case where discounting plays a major role with
respect to anticipatory feelings at dates 1 and 2, i.e. (1)  (2). This case includes also
models without anticipatory feelings.
Proposition 1 Let (1)  (2): At date 0, exibility is valuable if and only if
(2)ce > (1)E

c1jc1 < s01

; (5)
precommitment is valuable if and only if
(2)ce < (1)E

c1jc1 < s01

: (6)
The proof is in the Appendix and here we provide the intuition. A rigid plan does not
condition actions on the task cost realization, hence the expected task cost is constant,
ce. As (1)ce  (2)ce; at date 0 the agent prefers completing at date 2 rather than at
date 1. Under exible planning, instead, the expected cost of completing at date 1 is lower
than at date 2 because it is conditional on being lower than the cuto¤ value s01. If, from
the perspective of date 0, the conditional expected cost of completing the task at date 1,
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(1)E [c1jc1 < s01] ; is lower than the unconditional expected cost at date 2, (2)ce, then
exibility is valuable. Otherwise, it is better to stick to the rigid plan and precommitment
is valuable.
Interestingly, for exponential and quasi-hyperbolic discounters, exibility is always valu-
able. This seems at odds with the idea that sophisticated agents with present-biased prefer-
ences may demand precommitment to avoid incurring in dynamic choice reversals, and that
oftentimes exibility may be undesirable (Schelling, 1978, among others). However, it is not
the mere presence of present-biased preferences that may generate dynamic choice reversals,
but also how the costs are distributed over time. In general, for some distributions of fu-
ture costs an agent may prefer exibility, while for others she may prefer precommitment.
Instead, when the future expected costs are constant across dates, which is the case we are
focusing on, the cuto¤ value s01 is endogenously set in such a way that exibility is always
valuable (see the Appendix for the proof).6
Flexibility and precommitment may be valuable also for agents whose anticipatory feel-
ings are relatively more important than discounting for events occurring at dates 1 and 2,
as stated below:
Proposition 2 Let (1)  (2): At date 0, exibility is valuable if and only if
(2)ce < (1)E

c1jc1 > s01

; (7)
precommitment is valuable if and only if
(2)ce > (1)E

c1jc1 > s01

: (8)
3 Experimental design
We recruited subjects for an experiment made of three sessions over a one-month period.
These experimental sessions were run at two-week intervals at dates 0, 1, and 2. The main
decision was about when to listen to a 20-minute indivisible package of annoying noise7,
6Moreover, as shown in the Appendix, a naïve quasi-hyperbolic discounter values exibility more than a
sophisticated quasi-hyperbolic discounter.
7Note that the sound was unpleasant, but it did not cause pain. The noise had to be listened to once,
and the 20 minutes could not be spread over two or more sessions. Therefore, the concavity of the utility
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i.e., at date 0, 1, or 2. Following participation in all three sessions, each subject received
e30. Exactly 100 subjects started o¤ the experiment: 40 under treatment 1 and 60 under
treatment 2, which presents some di¤erences in the procedure.8 Unless otherwise noted, the
description refers to treatment 2. We begin by describing the procedure for session 0.
Session 0 included various color-coded parts: a ranking of the dates for noise listening
(blue), an auction for exibility (red), an auction for a dummy task (white), an auction for
listening to additional noise at 0 (yellow), and a choice of exit penalty (green). In treatment
1, the actual order was white, yellow, blue, red, and green, while in treatment 2 it was white,
blue, red, and green.
In the blue part, subjects expressed their preferences on when to listen to 20 minutes of
noise. Before choosing, everyone listened to a 3-minute sample noise. The available dates
were 0 (today), 1 (two weeks later) and 2 (four weeks later), which generated six possible
rankings (Table 1). At the end of the session, a 10-face die was rolled for every participant
to determine the date of noise listening, and depending on the die roll, subjects listened to
noise. If session 0 was ranked as most preferred, then the probability of listening to noise
at 0 (today) was 0:60; the probability was 0:10 when least preferred; and 0:30 otherwise.
The timing of noise listening had no impact on the monetary payments. In treatment 1, the
random draw and noise listening took place right after the blue part. Note that there is a
positive probability that the subject would listen to noise at any date. Each subject has the
incentive to truthfully reveal the ranking of noise listening for all sessions, and not simply
to reveal her most preferred date: she will benet from selecting the highest probability for
her most preferred date and the smallest probability for the least preferred one.
In the red part, participants were partitioned into groups of two and placed a bid to
buy exibility in a second-price auction. This exibility option allows for updating the blue
ranking two weeks later (date 1). The red coupons with the subjectsbids were publicly
collected, randomly partitioned into pairs, and stapled. Subjects with the highest bid in
their pair won the auction and paid the other bid amount in session 2. Auction results were
function cannot have any impact on the optimal timing of consumption. Instead, intertemporal choices
are usually elicited using larger rewards for later dates, which implies that, for a given discount factor, the
optimal timing of consumption also depends on the concavity of the instantaneous utility function.
8Treatment 2 was longer and also included intertemporal decisions about monetary rewards. We have
not yet analyzed choices over money.
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Rank Most preferred date Intermediate Least preferred date No. of Demand
for noise listening preference for noise for noise listening subjects for
listening (frequency) exibility
210 Four weeks later Two weeks later Today 5(5.7%) 2
102 Two weeks later Today Four weeks later 8(9.2%) 4
012 Today Two weeks later Four weeks later 57(65.5%) 16
201 Four weeks later Today Two weeks later 2(2.3%) 2
120 Two weeks later Four weeks later Today 10(11.5%) 2
021 Today Four weeks later Two weeks later 5(5.7%) 1
Total 87(100%) 71(100%)
Table 1: Ranking of preferred dates for noise listening, elicited in session 0.
Note: The table lists proles as they appeared in the instructions of treatment 2. The order in the
instructions of treatment 1 was 012, 102, 210, 021, 120, and 201. We did not detect a bias in favor
of the rst prole listed in the table. Information on exibility is available for n=71 subjects and
is coded as positive if the bid was above 5 eurocents.
revealed in session 1. This auction yields a measure of the willingness to pay for exibility.
Positive bids reveal a perceived uncertainty. Subjects from treatment 1 who had already
listened to noise in session 0 skipped the red part.
To familiarize subjects with the auction format, an auction for a dummy task (white)
preceded the red part. In the white part, participants stated their minimum compensation
for going to a room located one oor below the lab and bring back a book. An experimenter
publicly collected the bids, randomly partitioned and publicly stapled them in pairs. Subjects
with the lowest bid in their pair won the auction and received the other bid amount at the end
of the session. The results were shown on a screen, and the winners were publicly announced
and immediately requested to fetch the book. The instructions explicitly mentioned the
optimal strategy of revealing the true minimum compensation for the task. In treatment 1,
there were groups of four subjects.
Only treatment 1 had a yellow part with a second-price auction. Subjects bid for their
willingness to listen to a 20-minute package of noise in a random group of four. The lowest
bidder won the auction and listened to noise in session 0. Hence it was possible that in
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session 0 a subject listened twice to 20 minutes of noise, i.e., in the yellow and the blue
parts. The rationale of the yellow part was to check whether noise was annoying, which it
was.9
If a subject dropped out during a session, she received a show-up fee (e3, 1 subject did
drop out). In addition, a subject could refuse to listen to noise when asked to do so by
the experimenters, i.e. to opt out. A subject that participated in all three sessions and
opted out received e30 minus an exit penalty. In the green part, each subject chose her exit
penalty from among e15, e20, e25, and e30. The instructions explained that raising the
exit penalty could discourage opting out behavior and hence help in earning the full e30
participation fee. The exit penalty is a form of soft precommitment to listen to noise because
it does not remove the option of refusing to listen when asked to do so. Instead, it lowers the
temptation of not implementing a plan of action by making it less attractive not to listen to
noise.
At the end, the winners of the white and yellow auctions were paid. In treatment 1, a
non-anonymous questionnaire had to be completed before payment.
Session 1 included a ranking of the dates for noise listening (blue) and a choice over
opting out (green). All subjects listened to a 1-minute sample noise and then expressed their
preferences on when to listen to 20-minutes of noise between date 1 (today) and 2 (two weeks
later). The blue part was not completed by subjects who had listened to noise in session
0. Subjects learned the results of the auction for exibility (red) after completing the blue
part. For auction winners, the relevant preferences on the date of noise listening were those
revealed in session 1; for everyone else the relevant preferences were those revealed in session
0. A subject listened to noise in session 1 with a probability 0.66 if session 1 was ranked as
most preferred, 0.33 if least preferred.10 In the green part, subjects had the option to refuse
9With convex disutility a subject prefers spreading two packages of noise in two distinct sessions rather
than listening to both in the same session. Pilot experiments showed that the disutility of noise was indeed
convex. Auction winners still had to listen to a 3-minute sample noise in the blue part. Non-winners could
do any reading activity at their desk.
10In session 1, any probability larger than 0.50 of listening in the most preferred date can truthfully elicit a
subjects preference. Similarly, in session 0, as long as the highest probability of implementation corresponds
to the most preferred date and the lowest probability corresponds to the least preferred date, the subject
has the correct incentives to truthfully reveal her preferences. Hence, it is inconsequential for the stated
rankings whether the probabilities of implementation di¤er across sessions.
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to listen to noise if asked to do so. Finally, a 6-face die was rolled for every participant
to determine the date of noise listening, and depending on the die roll, subjects listened to
noise.
Session 2 included a choice over opting out (green) and a questionnaire. Subjects who
were not asked to listen to 20 minutes of noise in session 0 or 1 completed the green part
and, when appropriate, listened to noise. All subjects then completed a questionnaire and
received the participation fee net of the price paid by the winners of the auction for exibility
(red) and of the exit penalty paid by those who refused to listen to noise.
Subjects were recruited from the undergraduate population of the University of (omissis).
All sessions were run on Wednesdays. In the invitation message, we asked subjects to bring
reading material of their choice. In order to minimize attrition, the invitation message also
specied that participation was required in all three sessions. This may have generated an
oversampling of more patient subjects, but our aim is not a quantitative measure of the
discount factor.
Subjects were seated at computer terminals separated by partitions. No communication
among subjects was allowed. Instructions were distributed and read aloud. All decisions
were taken with pen and paper. The decisions concerning the di¤erent color-coded parts
were written on coupons of the same color. To listen to noise, subjects wore high-delity
headphones connected to the computer terminals. Including instruction reading, average
session durations were 120, 120, and 75 minutes, respectively. For treatment 1 average
session durations were about 75, 40, and 40 minutes, respectively. Overall, the average
payment per subject was 30e.
4 Predictions
The theoretical model presented in Section 2 supplies a useful framework to discuss in-
tertemporal choices, choice reversal and the demand for exibility and precommitment. In
order to provide benchmarks to evaluate the experimental results, we present predictions for
three special cases where intertemporal choices depend only on one component of the general
model. This allows understanding the impact of the three components of the general model:
discounting, uncertainty, and anticipatory feelings.
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Prediction 1 (Discounting utility model). Consider an agent who discounts the future
and has no anticipatory feelings, (t ) = D(t ) for all   t; let the task cost be certain
and constant across sessions, c = c for all  . Then the agent
a) chooses 210 in session 0, chooses 21 in session 1;
b) never exhibits dynamic, static and calendar choice reversal;
c) does not demand exibility.
Prediction 2 (Anticipatory feelings model). Consider an agent that does not discount
the future and has anticipatory feelings, (t   ) = A(t   ) for all   t; let the task cost
be certain and constant across sessions, c = c for all  . Then the agent
a) chooses 012 in session 0, chooses 12 in session 1;
b) never exhibits dynamic, static and calendar choice reversal;
c) does not demand exibility.
Prediction 3 (Stochastic utility model). Consider an agent who does not discount the
future, nor has anticipatory feelings, (t ) = 1 for all   t. Let the task cost be uncertain
and i.i.d. across sessions. Then the agent
a) chooses prole 012 or 021 in session 0 if the current cost is low, c0 < ce, and chooses
prole 210 or 120 if the current cost is high, c0 > ce; chooses prole 12 in session 1 if the
current cost is low, c1 < ce, and chooses prole 21 if the current cost is high, c1 > ce;
b) may exhibit static, dynamic, and calendar choice reversal;
c) demands exibility.
5 Results
This section presents four results, namely on proles for noise listening (Results 1 and 2),
on choice reversals (Result 3), and on the demand for exibility (Result 4). Exactly 100
participants initiated the experiment. Out of these, 12 subjects dropped out: 1 during session
0, 8 between session 0 and session 1, and 3 between session 1 and session 2. Moreover, 1
subject paid the exit penalty and attended all three sessions. Our full sample is therefore
made up of 87 fulllers: subjects who attended all three sessions and listened to noise when
asked to do so. Of this set of fulllers, 40 listened to noise at date 0. The restricted sample
is made up of the remaining 47 subjects who did not listen to noise at date 0 and therefore
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revealed their preferences both at dates 0 and 1 under proper incentives. Unless otherwise
noted, the results refer to the full sample of fulllers (N=87).
Result 1 In session 0, about 71% of subjects preferred to listen immediately; only 8% of
subjects preferred to listen in 4 weeks;
Table 1 provides support for Result 1. The evidence from choices in session 0 does not
support Prediction 1. According to Prediction 1, the best choice for agents discounting
the future is prole 210, which was chosen by only 5:7% of subjects. Hence exponential
and quasi-hyperbolic discounting models explain only a small fraction of the preferences of
subjects on when to listen to noise. On the contrary, 88:5% of the rankings revealed in
session 0 are compatible with a stochastic utility model (77=87 obs., Prediction 3). A similar
percentage is reported for the restricted sample (39=47 obs., 89%). A model of anticipatory
feelings predicts the choice of prole 012, which was the most common one (65:5% of choices,
Prediction 2). In sum, the observed choices over proles suggest that both uncertainty and
anticipatory feelings are possible motivations behind intertemporal choices (Predictions 2
and 3). In line with Result 1, we also report that in session 1 about 70% of the subjects
preferred to listen immediately.
Result 2 In session 0, about 86% of subjects preferred listening to noise in 2 weeks rather
than in 4 weeks.
Support for this result is in Table 1. Result 2 is also at odds with Prediction 1 (discounting
utility model) and it suggests that for intertemporal choices over noise, anticipatory feelings
may play a role (Prediction 2). The next result concerns choice reversal.11
Result 3 About 53% of subjects exhibited some form of choice reversal.
Table 2 provides support for Result 3. When considering the restricted sample, about
40% of subjects exhibited static choice reversal, 40% exhibited calendar choice reversal, and
25% exhibited dynamic choice reversal. In our setup, present-biased preferences do not
11Static choice reversal occurs if one chooses either 021, 021, 120, or 102. Dynamic choice reversal occurs
if one chooses 012, 102, 120 in session 0 and then 21 in session 1, or 210, 201, 021 in session 0 and then 12
in session 1. Calendar choice reversal occurs if either 012, 021 or 201 is chosen in session 1 and then 21 in
session 2, or 210, 201, or 210 in session 1 and then 12 in session 2.
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Rank Choice reversal No choice reversal Total number
Static Calendar Dynamic of subjects
210 0 2 2 3 5 (10.6%)
012 0 4 4 19 23 (48.9%)
Others 19 13 6 0 19 (40.4%)
Total 19 (40.4%) 19 (40.4%) 12 (25.5%) 22 (46.8%) 47 (100%)
Table 2: Static, dynamic, and calendar choice reversal.
Note: The restricted sample includes fulllers who did not listen to noise in session 0 (N=47).
In the larger sample of fulllers (N=87), 25 subjects exhibited static choice reversal.
generate choice reversal (Prediction 1). The widespread presence of choice reversal points
toward a fundamental role of other factors beyond present-biased preferences. Anticipatory
feelings is not one such factor: according to Prediction 2, subjects should never reverse their
choices. Hence the majority of the choices (53%) contradicts both Predictions 1 and 2.
By contrast, a stochastic utility model is compatible with the observed preference proles
and patterns of choice reversals (Prediction 3). Static and calendar choice reversals are found
empirically to occur with similar frequencies. A Pearson Chi-square test indicates that there
is a statistically signicant relationship between those exhibiting static and calendar choice
reversal: 13=19 of the subjects exhibiting static choice reversal also exhibit calendar choice
reversal, while 6=28 subjects exhibiting no static choice reversal also exhibit calendar choice
reversal (68:4% vs. 31:6%, Pearson 2(1)= 10:38; p = 0:001). In particular, evidence of
calendar choice reversal strongly suggests a role for exogenous shocks on the subjective
valuations of completing the task today versus completing it in two weeks.
Below we present the results on the demand for exibility, which are based on the choices
of 71 subjects.
Result 4 About 38% of subjects were willing to pay for exibility.
In a certainty scenario, neither exponential, nor quasi-hyperbolic discounters, nor subjects
with anticipatory feelings should demand exibility (Predictions 1 and 2). On the contrary,
exibility has value in an uncertainty scenario where the task cost can vary.
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Subjects who plan to listen in session 0 should be less willing to pay for exibility because
they are less likely to listen to noise in future sessions. We nd 17 subjects out of 48 with
ranking 012 and 021 who demanded exibility, versus 10 out of 23 with other rankings (35:4%
vs. 43:5%). However, there is no statistically signicant relationship between the demand
for exibility and the preference for listening in session 0 (Pearson 2(1)= 0:43 p = 0:51;
n = 71). Moreover, we report a higher demand for exibility among subjects who exhibited
some form of choice reversal. There are 11 subjects who demanded exibility out of the
25 who reversed their choices, and 7 subjects who demanded exibility out of the 22 who
never reversed their choices (44:0% vs. 31:8%, Pearson 2(1)= 0:7349; p = 0:39; n = 47).
Choice reversals may originate from a variety of reasons, for instance the shape of the weight
function or exogenous shocks. While the demand for exibility is an ex-ante measure of
uncertainty, calendar choice reversal best captures the ex-post impact of exogenous shocks
at decision time. In the data, there is a weakly signicant positive correlation among the
two measures: there are 10 subjects who demanded exibility out of the 19 who exhibited
calendar choice reversal, and 8 out of 28 who did not reverse their choices (52:6% vs. 28:6%,
Pearson 2(1)= 2:77; p = 0:10). A model of stochastic utility is compatible with these
patterns of behavior.12
The impact of individual characteristics is reported in Casari and Dragone (2010). Gender
did not play a signicant role in any of the above choices while in some of them cognitive
abilities, major, and smoking habits played a role. Subjects with higher cognitive abilities
were more likely to demand exibility. The results do not seem an artefact of the lack of
economic training, as subjects with humanities majors were more likely to behave according
to the discounting model (Prediction 1).
6 Discussion
Four aspects of the reported evidence deserve some comments. First, a large majority of
subjects chose to anticipate noise listening and to avoid doing it at the last available date,
which runs contrary to predictions of models based only on discounting. The magnitude
12Only 22.5% (16/71) increased the exit penalty. This evidence does not contradict Predictions 1 and 2,
although no quantitative prediction could be made. Half of the 71 subjects demanded neither exibility nor
an increase in the exit penalty.
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of this nding was unexpected (48=71 = 67:6% of subjects) and may be explained through
anticipatory feelings and stochastic utility. In particular, if subjects experience dread or
anxiety while waiting for the moment of noise listening, anticipating it may be optimal
(Prediction 2). When confronted with the data, a model of anticipatory feelings explains
about one third of the individual choices elicited at date 0 (28=71 = 39:4% of subjects). The
choice of anticipating noise listening is not related with experimental measures of cognitive
abilities. To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst incentivized experiment that shows a
role for anticipatory feelings in intertemporal choices over non monetary outcomes.13 Below
we will discuss the role played by uncertainty about the future task costs.
Second, about half of the subjects reversed their choices according to at least one of our
denitions. In our setup, present-biased preferences alone cannot lead to choice reversals.
More generally, within a certainty scenario choice reversal is not predicted by single-drive
models based on discounting or on anticipatory feelings. Instead, a model of stochastic
utility can go a long way in explaining the data because it encompasses anticipation of
noise listening, choice reversal, and demand for exibility. The key role of uncertainty in
intertemporal choices is revealed by two cues. One is demand for exibility, which is direct
evidence that the subject fears future shocks. The other is dynamic choice reversal, which
may occur in case of unpredicted events. In the restricted sample, 27 out of 47 subjects
either demanded exibility or displayed dynamic choice reversal (57%), which points toward
a substantive impact of uncertainty in intertemporal choices.
Third, in this study the canonical models of exponential or quasi-hyperbolic discounting
lack descriptive power (Prediction 1). In these models, the best option for noise listening
is the latest available date and the worst option is the earliest available date. Moreover,
they predict no demand for exibility and no choice reversal. Only 3 out of 71 subjects t
these predictions, which accounts for less than 5% of the observations. Hence, the empirical
evidence does not support an explanation that relies on discounting as the only drive. This
is not a statement that undermines the validity of models of discounting; rather, as we
have seen, it suggests that uncertainty and anticipatory feelings also contribute to explain
intertemporal choices.
Fourth, the experiment involved choices over a real e¤ort task, i.e. listening to annoying
13Loewenstein (1987) presents suggestive evidence of anticipatory feelings in various domains. The evidence
is based on hypothetical choices, which may not be robust to replication (Casari and Dragone, 2011).
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noise. Non-monetary choices are very relevant for a wide array of eld decisions, and there
exists a rich theoretical literature about non-monetary choices (e.g. ODonogue and Rabin,
1999). Yet, experiments with this feature are rare in the economic literature (for an example
concerning real e¤ort, see Falk and Ichino, 2006). We provide novel, incentivized evidence on
a real e¤ort task that is complementary to the existing studies based on monetary rewards.
Moreover, our design has the methodological advantage of addressing serious concerns related
to the storability and tradability of monetary rewards (Cubitt and Read, 2007) and to exhibit
predictions that do not depend on the concavity of the instantaneous utility function, nor
on the shape of the discounting function.
There is also an issue related to the costly e¤ort in completing the task, which confronts
subjects with choices over losses. One may wonder if our results would extend to decisions
over gains. We acknowledge that the size of the e¤ects we report may be task-specic. It
can be the case, for instance, that noise induces stronger anticipatory feelings than, say, a
massage, which would imply that our evidence over-estimates the importance of anticipatory
feelings. Unlike other studies, however, our aim is not a calibration of the discount factor,
nor the exact assessment of the quantitative impact of the various drives behind intertem-
poral choices. Our goal is to provide reliable evidence about the existence of stochastic
utility and anticipatory feelings as driving forces behind intertemporal choices. Hence, for
our conclusions the crucial design feature is the real-e¤ort nature of the task, which is par-
ticularly relevant if monetary rewards somehow "sterilize" the role of stochastic utility and
anticipatory feelings. We leave it to further experimental studies the investigation of other
tasks and rewards and to assess whether a similar magnitude of the reported ndings may
generalize to other scenarios.
7 Conclusions
We have studied time preferences and time consistency in an experiment that elicited a
subjects plan and then tracked its implementation over time. More specically, this paper
makes three main contributions. First, it documents in a controlled, incentivized setting a
widespread preference for completing a costly task immediately. Second, it o¤ers explana-
tions for these experimental results at the individual level. Third, it provides a systematic
analysis of time inconsistency through novel denitions and measurements of choice reversals.
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The experiment presents a highly innovative design where subjects faced a decision be-
tween completing a given task sooner or later. It is the simplest design we could think of to
study intertemporal choices. In most intertemporal choice experiments, the design usually
requires choices over two dimensions: amount and timing of the reward. Typically, subjects
face a decision between a smaller-sooner reward and a larger-later reward. In our setting,
there is no trade-o¤ between amount and timing of consumption because the only dimension
which is relevant for the subjects is timing. As a consequence, the predictions on the optimal
choice are straightforward: any participant who discounts the future wishes to bring forward
rewards to an earlier point in time and defer costs to a later point in time.
In the experiment, choices were made over a one-month horizon and had a dynamic
structure in the sense that subjects made decisions at multiple points in time, i.e., today
and then again two weeks later. We report that two thirds of the subjects prefer to com-
plete a costly task immediately, instead of postponing it at the last available date. This
overwhelming evidence of a preference for anticipating a costly task comes from a properly
incentivized experiment. Exponential or quasi-hyperbolic discounting are at odds with such
evidence. The empirical evidence is compatible with economic theory if one is willing to
admit stochastic utility and anticipatory feelings as factors a¤ecting intertemporal prefer-
ences. We consider a set of simple models and for each one we put forward predictions
on the optimal timing of consumption, demand for exibility, and possible choice reversal.
More specically, between 53% and 69% of subjects t the predictions of either a stochastic
utility or an anticipatory feelings model. Less than 5% of subjects t the predictions of
exponential or quasi-hyperbolic discounting models. However, this evidence does not sug-
gest that impatience and temptation play no role in intertemporal choices. Their role has
already been convincingly documented in several empirical studies. As the design is such
that exponential and quasi-hyperbolic discounters are predicted to behave in similar ways,
any deviation from these predictions simply suggests that discounting is not the only drive
a¤ecting intertemporal choices. Our conclusion is that the canonical exponential discounting
model or the quasi-hyperbolic discounting cannot t the empirical evidence, and additional
drives must be taken into account to understand intertemporal behavior.
Another contribution of this study concerns time inconsistency. Static choice reversal
occurred for about a third of the individuals. This result is novel because it occurred without
being triggered by temptation, showing that besides present-biased preferences there also
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exist other potential causes for choice reversals. In addition, we measure choice reversal in
a dynamic way. The literature on time consistency, as well as most anecdotes about self-
control, relies on subjects taking decisions at multiple points in time. By contrast, the
majority of experimental studies rely on a one-point measurement of time preferences. This
static measurement captures some relevant aspects of the issue, although it di¤ers from the
dynamic measurement studied by, e.g., Strotz (1955). Importantly, the presence of static
choice reversal does not necessarily imply the presence of dynamic choice reversal, nor vice
versa. We can measure the frequency of dynamic choice reversal in the data because of our
multi-stage design. We report that several subjects exhibit dynamic choice reversal over
time. Its frequency is comparable to the frequency of static choice reversal, although the
two types of choice reversal are not necessarily driven by the same factors.
Empirical studies of time preferences are methodologically di¢ cult because of the inter-
mingling of impatience, temptation, risk, uncertainty, and anticipatory feelings. This study
aims neither at obtaining quantitative estimates of discount factors nor at disentangling
exponential from quasi-hyperbolic discounting. Instead, the aim is to discover if there are
other motivations for intertemporal choices besides impatience and temptation. With its
dynamic design and real-e¤ort task, this study takes a step toward understanding intertem-
poral choices. The evidence calls for models of intertemporal choice with a wider range of
motivations, where impatience and temptation are complemented by stochastic utility and
anticipatory feelings.
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Appendix
A1. Under exible planning, for exponential and quasi-hyperbolic agents the
expected cost of waiting increases as the deadline approaches: 1 (s1ex) > 0 (s
0
ex).
This property does not hold for a generic weight function :
The expected weighted task costs are:
0
 
s0ex

= (1)F (s01)E

c1jc1 < s01

+ (2)
 
1  F  s01 ce; (9)
1
 
s1ex

= (1) ce: (10)
If F (s01) = 1, then
1
 
s1ex
  0  s0ex = (1)  ce   E c1jc1 < s01  0: (11)
If F (s01) < 1; then
1
 
s1ex
  0  s0ex = (1) ce    (1)F (s01)E c1jc1 < s01   (2)  1  F  s01 ce
= (1)
"Z c
c
¯
xf (x) dx 
Z s01
c
¯
xf (x) dx
#
   (2)  1  F  s01 ce
= (1)
Z c
s01
xf (x) dx   (2)  1  F  s01 ce; (12)
which implies
1 (s
1
ex)  0 (s0ex)
1  F (s01)
=  (1)E

c1jc1 > s01
   (2) ce:
Hence
1
 
s1ex

> 0
 
s0ex
,  (1)E c1jc1 > s01 >  (2) ce (13)
Note that E [c1jc1 > s01] 2 [ce; c] for all s01: If there are no anticipatory feelings, then  (2) 
 (1) and expression (13) always holds. In particular, it always holds for agents discounting
the future exponentially or quasi-hyperbolically, irrespective of whether they are sophisti-
cated or naïve quasi-hyperbolic discounters (i.e. irrespective of the belief on the cuto¤ value
s01).
While expression (13) may hold for agents with mild anticipatory feelings, it may not hold
for agents with strong anticipatory feelings. Consider for example the case where  () = A ()
and a su¢ ciently high anticipatory feeling such that A (2) > E [c1jc1 > s01]A (1) =ce: In such
a case 1 (s
1
ex) < 0 (s
0
ex) ; which implies that the cuto¤ values of a exible plan decrease as
the deadline approaches.
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A2. Optimal rankings in the general model
The optimal strategy of the agent depends on whether the plan is rigid or exible. Under
a rigid plan established in session 0, listening to noise in session 0 is preferred if and only if
the current cost is lower than the minimum expected cost in sessions 1 and 2,
c0   0 = minf(1);(2)gce:
Moreover, the optimal plan for the future sessions prescribes listening to noise in session 1
over session 2 if
(1) < (2):
Hence the optimal ranking assessed in session 0 under rigid planning is:
210 if (2)  (1)  c0=ce;
201 if (2)  c0=ce  (1);
021 if c0=ce  (2)  (1);
012 if c0=ce  (1)  (2);
102 if (1)  c0=ce  (2);
120 if (1)  (2)  c0=ce:
An agent who is perfectly patient and has no anticipatory feelings ((1) = (2) = 1) may
choose any plan, with the caveat that plans 102 and 201 should be chosen only if c0 = ce.
If (2) < (1) (because, e.g.,  () = D ()); the participant should choose either plan 021,
201, or 210. If (2) > (1) (because, e.g.,  () = A ()), the participant should choose either
plan 012, 102, or 120.
A3. Value of exibility
Flexibility is valuable if the weighted expected cost of a exible plan is lower than that
of a rigid plan. We now compute the value of exibility for the general case where the plan
is implemented probabilistically.14
Consider a person who makes a bid for exibility at date 0 after she knows she will not
listen to the noise in session 0 (treatment 1). Let p > 1=2 be the probability of listening to
the noise in session 1 when session 1 is preferred to session 2 or, alternatively, of listening in
14If the expected cost of a rigid plan is larger than that of a exible plan, analogous considerations hold
for the demand for precommitment.
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session 2 when session 2 is preferred to session 1 (in our design, p = 2=3). At session 0, the
expected weighted cost of listening in future sessions under rigid planning is
Crigid (0) =
8<: [(1  p) (1) + p(2)] ce[p(1) + (1  p) (2)] ce if (1) > (2)if (1) < (2) (14)
At session 0, the expected weighted cost of listening in future sessions under a exible scenario
is
Cex (0) = (1)

pF (s01)E

c1jc1 < s01

+ (1  p) (1  F (s01))E

c1jc1 > s01
	
+(2)

(1  p)F (s01) + p
 
1  F (s01)

ce
= (2p  1)F (s01)

(2)ce   (1)E c1jc1 < s01	 :
The maximumwillingness to pay for exibility is given by Crigid Cex: Depending on whether
there is a major role of discounting over anticipatory feelings, we have two possible cases:
Crigid (0) Cex (0) =
8<: (2p  1)F (s01) [(2)ce   (1)E [c1jc1 < s01]](2p  1) (1  F (s01)) [ (1)E (c1jc1 > s01)  (2)ce]
if (1) > (2)
if (1) < (2)
(15)
As the payment for exibility occurs in session 2 and the value of exibility is elicited in
session 0, the willingness to pay M (s01) is
M
 
s01

=
Crigid   Cex
D (2)
: (16)
Hence, in treatment 1, when  (2)   (1) the agent is willing to pay to switch from a rigid
to a exible plan at most
max

0;
(2p  1)F (s01)
D (2)
 
(2)ce   (1)E c1jc1 < s01 ;
which implies that exibility is valuable if
(2)
(1)
2

E [c1jc1 < s01]
ce
; 1

: (17)
If instead  (2)   (1), the agent is willing to pay to switch from a rigid to a exible plan
at most
max

0;
(2p  1) (1  F (s1))
D (2)
[ (1)E (c1jc1 > s1)  (2)ce]

;
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which implies that exibility is valuable if15
(2)
(1)
2

1;
E [c1jc1 > s01]
ce

: (18)
Overall, in treatment 1 exibility is valuable if
(2)
(1)
2

E [c1jc1 < s01]
ce
;
E [c1jc1 > s01]
ce

(19)
Now consider treatment 2, where the subjects make their bids to buy the exibility option
before they know whether they will listen to the noise in session 0. Let q > 0 be the
probability that they do not listen to the noise in session 0 (in our setup, it could be
either 4=10; 7=10 or 9=10; depending on whether listening in session 0 was ranked as the
best, intermediate or worst option, respectively). In treatment 2 the value of exibility is
qM (s01) : Hence it is the lowest, everything else equal, if the participant chooses 012 or 021.
A4. If E [c1] = E [c2] = ce; for exponential and quasi-hyperbolic discounters the
value of exibility is always positive. If c1 = E [c1] 6= E [c2] = c2; quasi-hyperbolic
discounters may value exibility or precommitment depending on the expecta-
tions on the task cost distribution.
Let E [c1] = E [c2] = ce: For agents discounting the future, the relevant condition for
assessing whether exibility is valuable is (see expression 17):
(2)ce   (1)E c1 < s01 = (2)ce   (1)
R s01
c
¯
xf (x) dxR s01
c
¯
f (x) dx
> 0
If F (s01) > 0; then
(2)ce
Z s01
c
¯
f (x) dx  (1)
Z s01
c
¯
xf (x) dx =
Z s01
c
¯
[(2)ce   (1)x] f (x) dx. (20)
A su¢ cient condition for (20) to be positive is
(2)ce   (1)s01  0;
which implies
(2)
(1)
ce  s01: (21)
15Note that the condition (2)(1) <
E(cjc>s01)
E(c) is the same ensuring 1(s
1) > 0(s
0) under exible planning.
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For agents that correctly assess the cuto¤ value at date 1, s01 = s
1
1 = (1) c
e; the su¢ cient
condition (21) becomes
(2)   (1)2 ; (22)
which holds for both exponential discounters (where  (1) =  and  (2) = 2) and sophis-
ticated quasi-hyperbolic discounters (where  (1) =  and  (2) = 2; with  2 (0; 1)).
For naïve quasi-hyperbolic discounters,  (1) =  and  (2) = 2; as for the sophisti-
cated agent, but the cuto¤ value is s01 = c
e (i.e. she believes she will use the same cuto¤
value as an exponential discounter). Also in such a case, the su¢ cient condition (20) holds.
Finally, note that a su¢ cient condition for (20) to be negative is
(2)ce   (1)c
¯
 0;
which means that, from the perspective of date 0, completing the task at date 1 at the lowest
possible cost is worse than completing the task at date 2.
Let E [c1] 6= E [c2] : Consider the following weight function:  (1) =  and  (2) =
2; where ;  2 [0; 1] : When  = 1; this function represents the discounting function of
an exponential discounter, while for  < 1 the function is a quasi-hyperbolic discounting
function. Consider the case where  = 1=2 and  = 1=2; and suppose the agent knows with
certainty that the expected cost of completing the task at date 1 and 2 is c1 = E [c1] = 8
and c2 = E [c2] = 24: From the perspective of date 1, postponing task completion to date 2
is preferred to completing immediately if
c1 >  (1)E [c2] ;
which clearly holds because 8 > 24=4 = 6: From date 0, however, this is not desirable because
 (1)E [c1] <  (2)E [c2] ;
i.e. because the expected cost of listening at date 1, which is 8=4 = 2; is lower than the
expected cost of listening at date 2, which is 24=8 = 3: In other words, given this distribution
of task costs, at date 1 there would be a dynamic choice reversal that is not desirable from
the perspective of date 0 (see 6). Hence exibility is not desirable and precommiting to
the rigid plan assessed at date 0 is the best option. This conclusion, however, depends on
the expectations on future task costs. As an example, consider the case where the cost of
34
completing the task at date 1 is c1 = 5: In such a case self-control problems would not arise,
despite the preferences being present-biased, because it is optimal to complete the task both
at date 1 and 2 (see 5).
A5. A naïve quasi-hyperbolic discounter values exibility more than a so-
phisticated quasi-hyperbolic discounter
We introduce two di¤erent notations for the cuto¤ value s10 used by naïve and so-
phisticated agents. Let snaive = ce be the cuto¤ value for the naïve agent, and let
ssoph = ce = sn be the (correct) cuto¤ value for the sophisticated agent (i.e. s01 = s
1
1).
Consider treatment 1 (for treatment 2 the same logic holds). Replacing ce = snaive=; the
di¤erence between the value of exibility for a naïve and the value for a sophisticated (see
15 and 16) is as follows:
M
 
snaive
 M  ssoph = (2p  1)
D (2)
 [F (sn) (sn   E [c1jc1 < sn])  F (sn) (sn   E [c1jc1 < sn])]
=
(2p  1)
D (2)


(F (sn)  F (sn)) sn  
Z sn
c
¯
xf (x) dx 
Z sn
c
¯
xf (x) dx

=
(2p  1)
D (2)

Z sn
sn
snf (x) dx 
Z sn
sn
xf (x) dx

=
(2p  1)
D (2)

Z sn
sn
(sn   x) f (x) dx

: (23)
Given that
R sn
sn
(sn   x) f (x) dx is strictly positive because x 2 [sn; sn] ; we conclude that
M (snaive) > M
 
ssoph

, which implies that a naïve quasi-hyperbolic discounter is willing to
pay more for exibility with respect to a sophisticated quasi-hyperbolic discounter.
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